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THE BUCK-PASSING GAME
ROBERTO COMINETTI‡, MATTEO QUATTROPANI§, AND MARCO SCARSINI¶
Abstract. We consider situations where a finite number of agents want to
transfer the responsibility of doing a job (the buck) to their neighbors in a social
network. This can be seen as network variation of the public good model. The
goal of each agent is to see the buck coming back as rarely as possible. We frame
this situation as a game where players are the vertices of a directed graph and
the strategy space of each player is the set of her out-neighbors. Nature assigns
the buck to a random player according to a given initial distribution. Each player
pays a cost that corresponds to the asymptotic expected frequency of times that
she gets the buck. We consider two versions of the game. In the deterministic
one each player chooses one of her out-neighbors once and for all at the beginning
of the game. In the stochastic version a player chooses a probability distribution
that determines which of her out-neighbors will be chosen when she passes the
buck. We show that in both cases the game admits a generalized ordinal potential
whose minimizers provide equilibria in pure strategies, even when the strategy
set of each player is uncountable. We also show the existence of equilibria that
are prior-free, in the sense that they do not depend on the initial distribution
used to initially assign the buck. We provide different characterizations for the
potential, we analyze fairness of equilibria, and, finally, we discuss a buck holding
variant in which players want to maximize the frequency of times they hold the
buck. As an application of the latter we briefly discuss the PageRank game.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The problem. Frequently, individuals living in a closed community tend to
unload on their neighbors the responsibility of fixing a problem. Each citizen would
benefit from having the problem fixed, but, since this involves a personal cost, agents
prefer to let somebody else do the job. This can be seen as a network version of
the classical free riding problem in which agents want to enjoy a public good and
have somebody else pay for it. In our model agents can only pass the buck to their
neighbors in an existing social network. They would like to be bothered by this issue
as little as possible, so they will do their best to not see it coming back in the future.
Strategically it is not enough to just pass the buck. The designated neighbor must
be chosen in a way that the buck will not cycle back too fast. Thus, the structure
of the network plays a key role in the solution of this problem.
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1.2. Our contribution. We model the situation as a game on a finite directed
graph, where agents are vertices of the graph and directed edges represent the pos-
sibility for an agent to transfer the buck to another agent. We look at situations
where the first agent to hold the buck is drawn at random by Nature. We first con-
sider the deterministic case in which agents designate the neighbor to whom they
will transfer the buck, once and for all at the beginning of the game. Their goal is
to see the buck coming back to them as rarely as possible, and the cost for an agent
is the expected asymptotic frequency of times that she gets the buck. Although the
costs depend on the asymptotic behavior of a process over time, our game is static,
since players choose their strategy at the beginning of the game and play the same
action whenever their turn comes, without any updating based on the history of the
game.
To show existence of pure Nash equilibria, we prove that the game has a gener-
alized ordinal potential. A classical result by Monderer and Shapley (1996) then
guarantees that its minimizers are pure Nash equilibria. Moreover, there always
exist equilibria that are prior-free, i.e., do not depend on the initial distribution
according to which Nature makes its draw. In general the game may have multiple
Nash equilibria and some of them might be prior-sensitive.
We then look at a stochastic version of the game in which the agents choose the
probability with which the buck is passed to each of their neighbors. This gives rise
to a Markov chain. When this chain is irreducible its unique stationary distribution
is precisely the cost vector of the game, and does not dependent on Nature’s initial
distribution. In general, we prove the existence of a generalized ordinal potential
and we use it to establish the existence of prior-free Nash equilibria. We then use the
Markov chain tree theorem to derive an explicit formula for the potential function.
We provide two alternative characterizations for the potential, showing that it can
be written either as the expected length of unicycles in the graph, or in terms of the
eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix. All of this establishes a new mathematically
intriguing bridge between the buck-passing game and Markov chains.
We also investigate fairness of the equilibria in buck-passing games, that is, we
study how unevenly the total cost is spread across players in equilibrium in com-
parison to what could be achieved by a benevolent planner who wants to minimize
disparity of treatment. In the spirit of Rawls (2009), we define the social cost func-
tion of a strategy profile as the highest cost across all players. Then we use the price
of anarchy and the price of stability to measure fairness. Typically these quantities
are used to measure efficiency of the worst and the best equilibrium, respectively:
the social cost is usually taken to be the sum of the costs of all the players. Since
our buck-passing game is a constant-sum game, efficiency is not an issue, but, using
a Rawlsian social cost functions, the price of anarchy and the price of stability can
be used as a measure of fairness.
In the last section we consider a class of games, called buck-holding games, which
have the same structure as buck-passing games, except that the cost becomes a
payoff, and the goal of each player is to see the buck coming back as often as
possible. We prove the existence of equilibria for this class of games and we show
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analogies and differences with respect to buck-holding games. We also show that
this class of games can be used to model PageRank, a tool to rank webpages.
1.3. Related literature. The issue of taking care for fixing a problem that affects
an entire community has been considered in different domains such as economics,
finance, behavioral science, medicine, political science, law, and philosophy.
Hood (2002) studies the issue of responsibility in the risk industry, considering
safety and hazard for food, mobile phones, dangerous behavior of people and ani-
mals, looking at risk perception and amplification with their political implications.
Steffel et al. (2016) discuss several hypotheses concerning delegation of choice, while
León et al. (2018) study the ability of individuals to assign responsibility between
various levels of government. Gardiner (2006) considers the issue of intergenerational
fairness, focusing on climate change and nuclear protection, and proposes a global
core precautionary principle to prevent one generation of individuals from shifting
the negative effects of their choices to the following generations. della Paolera et al.
(2011) study one and a half century of the Argentinian economy and model macroe-
conomic policies as a game between past, present, and future generations of political
rulers and economic agents. Sonnenberg (2005) uses a game-theoretic model to an-
alyze the practice of physicians to refer patients with difficult-to-handle pathologies
to some other specialist, even when it is clear that the patient will not reap any
benefit from seeing a new doctor. The model considered by Bolle (2017) is closer
in spirit to ours. In his model a finite number of players decide one after the other
whether to pay the cost of an action that is beneficial for the society, or to pass the
buck to the next player. He assumes that each player has incomplete information
about the preferences of the other players, and studies the Bayesian equilibrium of
the game.
Various classes of games on networks have been considered in the literature. In
some of them, which go under the name “network games”, the payoff of a player de-
pends only on her strategy and on the strategies of her neighbors (see, e.g., Galeotti
et al., 2010, Kearns et al., 2001, Parise and Ozdaglar, 2019, among many) This is
not the case in our model: the payoff of each player depends on the strategies of all
the other players.
Some of the equilibria in the buck-passing game are prior-free. A concept of
belief-free equilibrium has been considered by several authors in the framework of
extensive form games. The term derives from the fact that a player’s belief about his
opponent’s history is not needed for computing a best-reply. The concept has been
studied for the repeated prisoner dilemma Ely and Välimäki (2002), Piccione (2002),
and then generalized to larger classes of games by Ely et al. (2005), Miyagawa et al.
(2008), Hörner and Lovo (2009), Yamamoto (2009, 2014), and others. In Scarsini
and Tomala (2012) belief-free equilibria were studied for repeated congestion games
on traffic networks. In Bergemann and Morris (2017) belief-free rationalizability is
examined. Heller (2017) shows that belief-free equilibria are not robust, in the sense
that only trivial belief-free equilibria may satisfy evolutionary stability. A prior-free
approach has also been used in mechanism design. For a survey we refer to Hartline
and Karlin (2007), while for recent contributions we cite Chawla et al. (2014), Eden
et al. (2018), Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2016).
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As mentioned before, our fairness criterion is inspired by the work of Rawls (2009).
We adapted to this criterion the typical measures of inefficiency, i.e., the price of
anarchy (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 2009, 1999, Papadimitriou, 2001), and the
price of stability (Anshelevich et al., 2008, Schulz and Stier Moses, 2003). In most of
the literature the social cost is the sum of the costs of all the players. Since our buck-
passing game is a constant-sum game, using this social cost produces only trivial
results. Other social cost functions were considered, for instance, in Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou (2009, 1999), Vetta (2002), Mavronicolas et al. (2008), Fournier
and Scarsini (2019).
The main tools that we use to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria are
the existence of a generalized ordinal potential and the finite improvement prop-
erty. The relationship between these concepts is studied by Monderer and Shapley
(1996). We also rely on classical results for Markov chains, for which we refer to the
books of Aldous and Fill (2002), Levin and Peres (2017), Norris (1998). In partic-
ular we exploit the celebrated Markov chain tree theorem, attributed to Leighton
and Rivest (1986) (see also Anantharam and Tsoucas, 1989), which relates the sta-
tionary measure of the chain to the abundance of spanning trees in the underlying
graph. Counting the number of spanning trees in an undirected graph in terms
of the Laplacian’s spectral properties goes back to Kirchhoff (1847) and has been
generalized to weighted directed graphs by Brooks et al. (1940), see also Chaiken
and Kleitman (1978). Some generalization and variations of these results have been
proposed recently, see, e.g., Avena and Gaudillière (2018).
The seminal paper by Brin and Page (1998) introduces the so-called PageRank
dynamics as a tool to rank webpages, the ancestor of the algorithm used nowadays by
Google to produce an ordered list of pages as output of a query. In the past decade,
PageRank was intensively studied in both the theoretical and applied literature, see,
e.g. Andersen et al. (2008), Caputo and Quattropani (2019), Chen et al. (2017),
Garavaglia et al. (2018), Jeh and Widom (2003), Lee and Olvera-Cravioto (2017).
The papers by Avrachenkov and Litvak (2006), de Kerchove et al. (2008) are of
particular interest for our work. We refer the reader to Gleich (2015) for an overview
of the subject.
Finally, we point out that our model is related to a research stream that connects
Markov chains with the classical Hamiltonian cycle problem (see, e.g., Borkar et al.,
2004, 2009, 2012, Ejov et al., 2008, 2004, 2011, Filar and Krass, 1994, Litvak and
Ejov, 2009).
1.4. Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
analyzes the deterministic version of the buck-passing game. Section 3 introduces the
stochastic model. Section 4 studies fairness of the equilibria. Section 5 Introduces
the probabilistic tools which are needed to show the existence of a generalized ordinal
potential function. Section 6 deals with the potential nature of the game. Section 7
examines a class of games where players have an interest in seeing the buck as often
as possible and explores the PageRank model.
1.5. Graph terminology and notations. Throughout this paper we consider a
directed graph G = (V, E), which represents a social network, with V = {1, . . . , n}
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the set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V the set of edges. We assume that G is simple
with at most one edge between any two vertices, and without loops. The following
standard terminology will be used hereafter:
(a) The set of out-neighbors of vertex i is denoted by N+i = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. Its
cardinality
∣∣N+i ∣∣ is called the out-degree of the vertex.
(b) A path is a sequence of edges e1, . . . , ek where, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, the
head of ei coincides with the tail of ei+1.
(c) The graph G is strongly connected if for every i, j ∈ V there exists a path
from i to j.
(d) A subgraph is a graph G(V ′, E ′) with V ′ ⊆ V and E ′ ⊆ E .
(e) A cycle is a strongly connected subgraph where each vertex has out-degree
1.
(f) A unicycle is a subgraph where each vertex has out-degree 1 and which
contains exactly one cycle.
(g) An i-rooted tree is a subgraph that contains no cycles and such that i has
out-degree 0 and the other vertices have out-degree 1.
2. The deterministic buck-passing game
2.1. The game. We consider a finite game Γ(G, µ) where G = (V, E) is a simple
directed graph and µ = (µi)i∈V is a given probability distribution over the vertices.
Each vertex i ∈ V is a player with strategy set Si = N+i (assumed nonempty with
i 6∈ Si), and S = ×i∈VSi is the set of strategy profiles.
Once each player has chosen an out-neighbor si ∈ Si, the cost for a player is
the asymptotic frequency of times she has the buck, determined by the following
process. At time t = 0 a buck is given to a vertex i0 ∈ V drawn at random by
Nature according to the initial distribution µ. At time t = 1, the selected player i0
passes the buck to her designated neighbor i1 = si0 , who in turn will pass it at time
t = 2 to her chosen neighbor, and so on and so forth. Define the random variables
Θi,t(s) =
{
1 if at time t player i has the buck,
0 otherwise.
(2.1)
For a fixed profile s, the value of Θi,t depends only on the initial draw, with
P(Θi,0(s) = 1) = µi. (2.2)
After this initial draw, the buck is passed among the players and eventually it will
start cycling, so that we can define the cost function ci : S → R for player i as
ci(s) = E
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Θi,t(s)
]
, (2.3)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the initial measure µ.
This game is denoted Γ(G, µ,S) and is called a deterministic buck-passing game
(DBPG). The corresponding set of Nash equilibria is denoted NE(S). We assume
that the graph G, the initial measure µ, and the buck-passing dynamics are common
knowledge. We stress that, despite the fact that the costs are defined through a
dynamic process, the game is actually static, with strategies fixed once and for all
THE BUCK-PASSING GAME 7
at the beginning of the game. Note also that the costs of all players add up to 1, so
that this is equivalent to a zero-sum game. To analyze this game, it is convenient
to have a more manageable expression for the costs in (2.3), for which we introduce
some additional notation.
Definition 2.1. We call Gs = (V, Es) the subgraph induced by the strategy profile
s with edge set Es = {(i, si) : i ∈ V}. Each vertex has out-degree 1 so that Gs is
a union of a finite number M(s) of disjoint unicycles (see Fig. 1). We call A`s for
` = 1, . . . ,M(s) the vertex sets of these unicycles, so that V = A1s ∪˙ · · · ∪˙ AM(s)s ,
and we let C`s ⊆ A`s be the vertices in the corresponding cycles.
Figure 1. The graph G on top has 2 strongly connected components and
3 transient vertices. The induced graph Gs on the bottom has two disjoint
unicycles with cycles of length 3 and 4.
If the buck is assigned initially to a vertex in A`s, then, after finitely many steps,
it will reach the cycle C`s and turn around forever. In the long run each player i ∈ C`s
gets the buck a fraction 1/|C`s| of the time, while the remaining players are free-riders
with a cost of 0. Now, the probability that the buck is assigned initially to a vertex
in A`s is
µ`s :=
∑
j∈A`s
µj . (2.4)
Hence, denoting `(i) the label of the unicycle that contains player i and setting
δi(s) :=
{
1 if i ∈ C`(i)s ,
0 otherwise,
(2.5)
the expected cost in (2.3) can be written as
ci(s) =
µ
`(i)
s
|C`(i)s |
δi(s). (2.6)
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2.2. Ordinal potentials and existence of prior-free equilibria. As every finite
game, the buck-passing game admits equilibria in mixed strategies. However, our
main interest here is the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Unless
otherwise stated, we always refer to equilibria in pure strategies. We now recall the
concepts of profitable deviations and equilibria.
Definition 2.2. Consider a cost game.
(a) Given a strategy profile s ∈ S, a unilateral deviation for player i is a strategy
s′ ∈ S that differs from s only in its i-th coordinate. It is a profitable
deviation if in addition ci(s′) < ci(s), in which case the difference ci(s) −
ci(s
′) is called the improvement of player i.
(b) A strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player has a
profitable deviation. Similarly, it is an ε-Nash equilibrium (ε-NE) if no
player has a profitable deviation with an improvement larger than ε.
In principle, a buck-passing game Γ(G, µ,S) may have multiple equilibria and they
may depend on the initial measure µ. Of special interest are the so-called prior-free
equilibria, i.e., equilibria that are invariant with respect to the initial measure µ.
Definition 2.3. A prior-free Nash equilibrium (PFNE) is a strategy profile that is
a Nash equilibrium for every initial distribution µ.
Our main result for the deterministic buck-passing game is the existence of prior-
free equilibria. This will be proved by showing the existence of a generalized ordinal
potential that does not depend on the initial measure µ. Potential games were
introduced in the seminal paper by Rosenthal (1973) and later studied extensively
by Monderer and Shapley (1996). A recent account can be found in Lã et al. (2016).
We recall these notions for a general cost game (V,S, c), where V is a finite set of
players, S = ×i∈VSi is the set of strategy profiles with Si the (possibly uncountable)
set of strategies for player i ∈ V, and ci : S → R is the cost of player i ∈ V.
Definition 2.4. A function Ψ : S → R is called a potential for (V,S, c) if for each
strategy profile s and any unilateral deviation s′ = (s′i, s−i) by a player i, we have
ci(s
′)− ci(s) = Ψ(s′)−Ψ(s). (2.7)
Similarly, Ψ is said to be an ordinal potential if
ci(s
′) < ci(s)⇔ Ψ(s′) < Ψ(s) (2.8)
and is called a generalized ordinal potential if
ci(s
′) < ci(s)⇒ Ψ(s′) < Ψ(s). (2.9)
Clearly the notion of generalized ordinal potential is the weakest. It is also easy
to see that a component-wise minimizer of a generalized ordinal potential is a Nash
equilibrium. If Ψ is in fact an ordinal potential, these minimizers coincide with the
Nash equilibria. For later reference we record the following direct consequence.
Proposition 2.5. Every generalized ordinal potential game, which is either finite
or, more generally, which has compact strategy sets and a lower semi-continuous
potential, admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Definition 2.6.
(a) An improvement path is a sequence of strategy profiles s0, s1, . . . such that
each sk+1 is a profitable deviation of sk for some player ik. It is called an
ε-improvement path if the improvement at each stage is at least ε.
(b) A game has the finite improvement property (FIP) if every improvement
path is finite. Similarly, it has the ε-finite improvement property (ε-FIP) if
every ε-improvement path is finite.
Monderer and Shapley (1996) showed that a finite game has a generalized ordinal
potential if and only if it satisfies the FIP. For a similar characterization of ordinal
potentials see Voorneveld and Norde (1997).
Remark 2.7. The FIP can also be described by means of an auxiliary graph—which
we call the meta-graph of the game to avoid confusion with the other graphs men-
tioned in the paper—where a vertex represents a strategy profile and a directed edge
(s, s′) exists iff s′ is a profitable deviation from s for some player i. Then, the FIP
is equivalent to the acyclicity of the meta-graph. A similar construction is used, for
instance, in Candogan et al. (2011). Note that NE are precisely the sinks of the
meta-graph, i.e., meta-vertices with out-degree equal to zero. Since every path on
an acyclic directed graph is finite and ends in a sink, this shows again that a finite
game satisfying the FIP admits a NE.
With these preliminaries, we proceed to establish our main results for the deter-
ministic buck-passing game. We will prove the existence of a generalized ordinal
potential, from which we will deduce not only that its minima are Nash equilibria
in pure strategies but also that they are prior-free. Furthermore, we establish a
bound for the maximum length of an improvement path, which implies that any
best response dynamics must reach a prior-free equilibrium in quadratic time.
Since a cost that is already at zero cannot be decreased, it follows from (2.6) that
a profitable deviation may only concern a player i who is on a cycle Chs with µhs > 0.
Such a player has two options to reduce her cost: increase the length of the cycle
she is currently in, or break the cycle by sending the buck to a different unicycle so
that her cost drops to zero. More precisely these options are:
(d1) shift to s′i ∈ Ahs \ Chs so that the cycle becomes longer,
(d2) shift to s′i 6∈ Ahs so that the cycle Chs disappears.
These deviations affect only the cycle of the deviating player, either by increasing
its length, or by breaking it and merging Ahs altogether into some other unicycle.
All the other cycles remain unaltered, even if their unicycles may change. Our first
result identifies a potential function based on the length of these cycles.
Theorem 2.8. The deterministic buck-passing game Γ(G, µ,S) is a generalized or-
dinal potential game with generalized ordinal potential function
Ψ(s) :=
M(s)∑
`=1
(
n− |C`s|
)
, (2.10)
where C`s are the cycles in the induced subgraph Gs = (V, Es) (see Definition 2.1). If
the initial measure µ has full support, then Ψ is an ordinal potential.
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Proof. Consider a strategy profile s ∈ S and let h = `(i) be the unicycle containing
player i in Gs. Consider also a deviation by player i from s to s′ = (s′i, s−i).
If the deviation is profitable, that is, ci(s′) < ci(s) then, as noted above, there
are only two possible cases. After a deviation (d1) the new graph Gs′ has the same
cycles except for Chs which becomes longer, so that only this term in the sum in
(2.10) is affected and Ψ(s′) < Ψ(s). On the other hand, a deviation (d2) removes
the cycle Chs keeping the other cycles unchanged, so that we lose one term in (2.10)
and again Ψ(s′) < Ψ(s). This proves that Ψ is a generalized ordinal potential.
We next show that, when µ has full support, the reverse implication holds, that is,
Ψ(s′) < Ψ(s) implies ci(s′) < ci(s). The inequality Ψ(s′) < Ψ(s) conveys a change
in the structure of cycles, which can only occur if the deviating player i is on a cycle
Chs . The deviation can only affect this cycle by removing it or changing its length,
so again we distinguish these two cases. In the first case a reduction of the potential
requires the length of the cycle to increase |Chs′ | > |Chs |, which imposes s′i ∈ Ahs \ Chs .
In this case Ahs′ = Ahs so that µhs′ = µhs > 0 and ci(s′) < ci(s) follows from (2.6).
The second case occurs when s′i 6∈ Ahs, in which case ci(s′) = 0 < ci(s), where the
strict inequality follows from (2.6) by noting that δi(s) = 1 and µhs > 0. 
Theorem 2.9. Every deterministic buck-passing game Γ(G, µ,S) admits a PFNE.
Proof. Since Γ(G, µ,S) is a finite game, the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium
follows directly from Theorem 2.8 and Proposition 2.5. To prove the existence of
a prior-free equilibrium it suffices to note that the expression Ψ in (2.10) does not
depend on the initial distribution µ, so that a global minimizer of Ψ is a PFNE. 
We stress that, when µ is fully supported, Ψ(s) provides an ordinal potential
and NE are exactly its component-wise minimizers. Since Ψ(s) does not depend on
µ it follows that in this case all NE are prior-free. In other words, prior-sensitive
equilibria can appear only when µ is not fully supported.
Example 2.1. Consider the graph G on the left of Fig. 2, and suppose that µ is a
degenerate measure that puts all the mass on the red vertex v in the central figure.
Then the strategy profile shown in this central figure is a NE which is not prior-free.
Indeed, if we take a different measure µ′ which puts some positive mass on one of
the green vertices i, j, k, then k has a profitable deviation, which gives rise to the
PFNE shown on the right.
Figure 2. Left: the graph. Middle: a NE that is not prior-free. Right: a PFNE
THE BUCK-PASSING GAME 11
In view of Theorem 2.8, and according to Monderer and Shapley (1996), it follows
that every deterministic buck-passing game has the FIP. Furthermore, considering
the two types of profitable deviations (d1) and (d2), we see that, if in a given
strategy profile s ∈ S two vertices i and j are in the same unicycle, the same holds
for every s′ ∈ S that can be reached by following an improvement path. To be
picturesque, we could say that, once the destinies of two players meet, they are
doomed to be entangled forever. In the language of probability, the evolution along
an improvement path is a coalescence process. This observation leads to an explicit
bound on the maximum length of an improvement path in terms of the number
of players n, and it implies that a best response dynamics will attain a PFNE in
quadratic time.
Theorem 2.10. In every deterministic buck-passing game Γ(G, µ,S) the length of
an improvement path is at most 14n
2 − 1, and this bound is tight.
Proof. Let φk be the maximum length of an improvement path when we start from
a strategy profile with M(s) = k unicycles. As noted before, there are two types of
profitable deviations, (d1) and (d2), in which either the length of a cycle increases
or a unicycle merges into another. Since each unicycle contains at least 2 vertices,
there can be at most n − 2k deviations of type (d1) before dropping in the next
deviation to k − 1 unicycles. This yields the bound
φk ≤ (n− 2k + 1) + φk−1
and inductively we get
φk ≤
k∑
i=2
(n− 2i+ 1) + φ1 = kn− k2 + 1− n+ φ1.
By the same argument as above we have φ1 ≤ n− 2 which yields
φk ≤ kn− k2 − 1.
The maximum of the last expression is attained at k = bn2 c. Ignoring the rounding
and maximizing for k ∈ R we get φk ≤ 14n2 − 1.
We next show that this bound can be reached. Consider a complete graph Kn
with an even number of vertices and a uniform initial measure µ. Take an initial
strategy profile with exactly k = n/2 cycles C1, . . . , Ck with 2 players each, and
consider the following sequence of unilateral profitable deviations:
(1) Break the cycle C1 by connecting it as a path to the cycle C2. This counts as
a single step, after which the cycle C2 has a “tail” composed by the vertices
in C1. Call i the vertex in C2 to which such tail is connected and let j be
the predecessor of i in C2. Note that j can reduce her cost by connecting to
any vertex of the tail: the farther the selected player in the tail, the lower
the resulting cost for the deviating player j. Consider the scenario where j
chooses the worst profitable deviation, by selecting the closest player in the
tail as new designated out-neighbor. Repeat this procedure until C1 and C2
are merged into a unique cycle C1,2 with 4 vertices. This requires 2 steps.
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(2) Break the cycle C1,2 by connecting it as a path to C3. This requires 1 step.
Enlarge the cycle C3 by collecting one by one the elements of C1,2 as in (1)
until merging into a unique cycle C1,2,3 with 6 vertices. This requires 4 steps.
...
(k) Break the cycle C1,...,k−1 and connect it to Ck. This requires 1 step. Enlarge
Ck by collecting the elements of C1,...,k−1 as before. This requires 2(k − 1)
steps. This final cycle is Hamiltonian, hence a NE.
In total we have
∑k−1
i=1 2i = k(k− 1) steps of type (d1) and k− 1 steps of type (d2),
which altogether give exactly (k + 1)(k − 1) = k2 − 1 = 14n2 − 1 steps. 
Remark 2.11. Notice that the trivial upper bound for the length of a path in the
meta-graph of the game is |S|. For a directed graph with minimum out-degree 2,
that is, when players can really act strategically, the size of S is exponentially large
with |S| ≥ 2n, which is far worse than the quadratic bound established above.
3. The stochastic buck-passing game
3.1. The game. We now extend the deterministic model of Section 2 by allowing
players to pass the buck at random to some neighbor. Specifically, the strategy set
of player i ∈ V is now the simplex of probabilities over N+i . This is isomorphic to
the set Σi of probability vectors pii on V such that pii(j) ≡ piij = 0 for all j 6∈ N+i .
We call Σ = ×i∈VΣi the set of strategy profiles. With a slight abuse of notation, the
same symbol pi will denote the strategy profile (pi1, . . . ,pin) ∈ Σ and the stochastic
matrix [piij ]i,j∈V whose rows are pi1, . . . ,pin. We also call Gpi the induced weighted
directed graph with vertices in V, edges in Epi := {(i, j) : piij > 0}, and weights piij .
At the start of the game each player chooses a strategy pii ∈ Σi. At time t = 0
the buck is given to a player i drawn at random according to the measure µ. This
player then passes the buck to a random neighbor sampled according to pii, and
so on and so forth. Rigorously, the process is a time-homogeneous Markov chain
(Xt)t≥0 with initial measure µ and transition matrix pi, that is,
Ppi(X0 = i) = µi and Ppi(Xt+1 = j | Xt = i) = piij , (3.1)
where Ppi is the probability measure induced by the strategy profile pi. The cost
ci : Σ→ R of player i is again defined by Eq. (2.3), but this time the expectation is
taken with respect to both the initial measure µ and the transition matrix pi. We
call Γ(G, µ,Σ) a stochastic buck-passing game (SBPG), and we write NE(Σ) for its
set of Nash equilibria.
The analysis of SBPGs requires some standard concepts in the theory of Markov
chains. We recall that a recurrent class in Gpi is a strongly connected component C
which is maximal by inclusion. For each pi the vertex set can be partitioned as
V = V0pi ∪˙ C1pi ∪˙ . . . ∪˙ CM(pi)pi , (3.2)
where each C`pi is a recurrent class in Gpi, V0pi is the set of transient vertices that do
not belong to any recurrent class, and ∪˙ indicates the disjoint union.
The restriction of the chain to each C`pi is itself an irreducible chain which supports
a unique stationary measure ρ`pi. For convenience we extend this measure to the full
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vertex set by setting ρ`pi(i) = 0 for i 6∈ C`pi. These measures are characterized by the
classical ergodic theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Ergodic Theorem). Consider an irreducible Markov chain (Xt)t≥0
on a finite state space V, with transition matrix pi and initial distribution µ. Let ρpi
be the unique stationary measure, and Ti = inf{t > 0|Xt = i} the hitting time of
state i. Then
E
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
1{Xt=i}
]
= ρpi(i) =
1
E[Ti | X0 = i] . (3.3)
The proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found, for instance, in (Levin and Peres, 2017,
Theorem C.1 and Proposition 1.19).
For a general Markov chain (not necessarily irreducible), starting from any state
j ∈ V the chainX will eventually be absorbed in a recurrent class C`pi with probability
Pj→`pi := P(there exists T ∈ N such that XT ∈ C`pi | X0 = j), (3.4)
so that the total probability with which the buck is absorbed in C`pi is
µ`pi =
∑
j∈V
µj P
j→`
pi . (3.5)
Thus, applying Theorem 3.1 on each recurrent class C`pi, the cost for player i in
Eq. (2.3) can be finally expressed as
ci(pi) =
M(pi)∑
`=1
µ`pi ρ
`
pi(i). (3.6)
Note that this is equivalent to Eq. (2.6) when pi is a deterministic strategy profile.
Remark 3.2. A SBPG is not the mixed extension of a deterministic game DBPG.
Given the cost function in Eq. (2.3), a probability vector pii ∈ Σi is not a mixed
strategy for DBPG. The difference is that in a SBPG, each time a player receives
the buck, a new neighbor is drawn at random, whereas in the mixed extension of
DBPG this random neighbor is drawn at the beginning of the game and kept fixed
thereafter. To illustrate the difference, let G be the complete graph on three vertices
V = {1, 2, 3} and consider the strategy profile (see Fig. 3):
pi1 =
(
0,
1
2
,
1
2
)
, pi2 = (1, 0, 0), pi3 = (0, 1, 0). (3.7)
Using (3.6), we can see that in the SBPG the profile pi has a cost vector equal to
the stationary distribution it induces, that is,(
2
5
,
2
5
,
1
5
)
.
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Figure 3. Left: A complete graph with 3 vertices. Right: The strategy (3.7).
If instead we take (3.7) as a mixed strategy in the DBPG, then the cost for player
1 is
c1(pi) =
1
2
E
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Θ1,t(2, 1, 2)
]
+
1
2
E
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Θ1,t(3, 1, 2)
]
=
1
2
1
2
+
1
2
1
3
=
5
12
6= 2
5
.
3.2. Relation between the deterministic and stochastic games. Even if SBPG
is not the mixed extension of DBPG, we next show that—as it happens for mixed
extensions—equilibria for the deterministic game are preserved in the stochastic set-
ting. In line with the notation introduced in Section 2, we call Si the extreme points
of Σi, so a strategy in Si is a degenerate measure and corresponds to choosing an
out-neighbor with probability 1.
Proposition 3.3. For each buck-passing game Γ(G, µ) we have NE(S) ⊆ NE(Σ).
Proof. By contradiction, suppose there exists some s ∈ NE(S) such that s 6∈ NE(Σ).
Notice that
Epi[Ti | X0 = i] = 1 +
∑
j∈V
piij Epi[Ti | X0 = j]
= 1 +
∑
j∈V
piij Epi−i [Ti | X0 = j],
(3.8)
with the obvious meaning of the symbols. In particular, if we consider a deterministic
profile s ∈ S, then
Es[Ti | X0 = i] = 1 + Es−i [Ti | X0 = si]. (3.9)
Consider first the case where M(s) = 1. In this setting, if s ∈ NE(S), then, thanks
to (3.3), for every i ∈ V,
si ∈ arg max
k∈N+i
Es−i [Ti | X0 = k]. (3.10)
Hence, by (3.8), if s 6∈ NE(Σ), there exists i ∈ V and some pii ∈ Σi such that∑
j∈V
piij Es−i [Ti | X0 = j] > Es−i [Ti | X0 = si]. (3.11)
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In particular, there exists some j 6= si such that
Es−i [Ti | X0 = j] > Es−i [Ti | X0 = si]. (3.12)
In this case, s′i = j is a profitable deviation for player i for the deterministic buck-
passing game. This contradicts the assumption that s ∈ NE(S).
If s induces more than a single recurrent class and s ∈ NE(S), then, whenever i
lies in a cycle C` of Gs having µ`s > 0, all her out-neighbors are in the same unicycle.
Hence, by the same argument as above, there is no randomized profile pi = (pii, s−i)
such that ρ`pi(i) < ρ`s(i). On the other hand, if µ`s = 0 then, clearly, player i has
no improving deviation. Therefore, also in the case of multiple recurrent classes we
have s ∈ NE(S)⇒ s ∈ NE(Σ). 
The stochastic buck-passing game gives each player a richer set of strategies, so it
is not surprising that we get a larger set of equilibria. Example 3.1 below shows that
the set of equilibria may be strictly larger in the stochastic setting, and illustrates
that some players may be favored by the larger strategy sets, whereas others will be
affected negatively.
Example 3.1. Consider a graph consisting of a uni-directional cycle with vertices
i = 1, . . . , n − 1 plus a central player n connected bi-directionally to all the other
vertices (see Fig. 4). For each player i on the outer cycle denote by i− and i+
respectively the predecessor and successor vertices along the cycle.
Figure 4. A clockwise wheel, with 6 outer vertices plus a central player.
Consider first the DBPG. Once the central player has designated an out-neighbor
i, it is a dominant strategy for the latter to forward the buck along the cycle to her
out-neighbor i+. The same holds for all subsequent players along the cycle, except
for player i−, for whom it is a dominant strategy to return the buck to the central
player. This yields a Hamiltonian cycle. There are exactly n − 1 such cycles, one
for each i, and these are exactly the equilibria in NE(S). In each of these equilibria
each player pays 1/n.
Now consider the strategy profile pi ∈ Σ in the SBPG in which the central player
sends the buck uniformly at random with probability 1/(n − 1) to each vertex in
the outer ring, whereas any other player i plays a deterministic strategy sending the
buck to the next player i+ along the cycle. We claim that pi ∈ NE(Σ). The central
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player is transient and pays 0, so that she has no profitable deviation. Each player i
on the outer ring pays 1/(n− 1). If she deviates to a stochastic strategy by sending
to player i+ with probability p and to the central player with probability (1 − p),
then her expected return time is
Epi[Ti | X0 = i] = 1 + p Epi[Ti | X0 = i+] + (1− p) Epi[Ti | X0 = n]
= 1 + p (n− 2) + (1− p) 1
n− 1(1 + 2 + · · ·+ (n− 1))
= 1 + p (n− 2) + (1− p)n
2
.
For n ≥ 5 this expression is strictly increasing with p so that, according to (3.3),
the minimum cost is attained for p = 1, which proves that pi is indeed a NE. In this
equilibrium the central player pays 0 and is better off than in the DBPG, whereas
all the other players are worse off, since their cost is now 1/(n− 1) rather than 1/n.
4. Fairness of equilibria
4.1. Measures of fairness. As seen in Example 2.1, a buck-passing game may
have several equilibria and in some of them the total cost is very unevenly spread
among players. We want to compare—in terms of fairness—the equilibrium cost
vectors with the optimum cost vectors that could be achieved by a benevolent social
planner, whose goal is to minimize disparity in the way players are treated. To this
end we adopt a Rawlsian criterion, (see Rawls, 2009), and we define the social cost
of a strategy profile as the cost incurred by the player who pays the most
SC(s) = max
i∈V
ci(s) (4.1)
so that minimizing this social cost corresponds somehow to maximizing fairness
among the players of the game.
Equilibrium and optimum costs are usually compared in terms of efficiency. Typ-
ically the social cost function is taken as the sum of the costs incurred by all players.
The standard measures of efficiency in games are the price of anarchy (PoA), i.e.,
the ratio between the social cost of the worst equilibrium and the minimum social
cost, and the price of stability (PoS), i.e., the ratio between the social cost of the
best equilibrium and the minimum social cost. Explicitly, if SC : S → R is the social
cost function for a deterministic buck-passing game, we define
PoA(S) := maxs∈NE(S) SC(s)
mins∈S SC(s)
, (4.2)
PoS(S) := mins∈NE(S) SC(s)
mins∈S SC(s)
. (4.3)
For stochastic buck-passing games, SC : Σ→ R and
PoA(Σ) :=
maxpi∈NE(Σ) SC(pi)
minpi∈Σ SC(pi)
, (4.4)
PoS(Σ) :=
minpi∈NE(Σ) SC(pi)
minpi∈Σ SC(pi)
. (4.5)
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Since the buck-passing game is a constant sum game, efficiency is not an issue:
if social cost is the sum of the player costs, all strategy profiles are equally efficient.
On the other hand, by using the social cost function in (4.1), the PoA and PoS can
be used to measure fairness. The smaller the PoA (PoS), the fairer the worst (best)
equilibrium. We are not the first to use social cost functions that are not the sum
of individual costs (see for instance Fournier and Scarsini, 2019, Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou, 2009, 1999, Mavronicolas et al., 2008, Vetta, 2002).
The next proposition establishes tight bounds for both the PoA and the PoS.
Proposition 4.1. For any buck-passing game Γ(G, µ) we have
(a) PoS(S) ≤ PoA(S) ≤ n/2.
(b) PoS(Σ) ≤ PoA(Σ) ≤ n/2.
Moreover, there are instances where PoS(S) = PoS(Σ) = n/2 and all these inequal-
ities are satisfied as equalities.
Proof. By definition PoS is always smaller than PoA so that it suffices to establish
the upper bound of n/2 in both DBPG and SBPG. In both cases the worse that
can happen to a player is to receive the buck every other period so that, for any
possible strategy profile, no player pays more than 1/2. On the other hand, since
the sum of costs over all players is 1, the minimum social cost in both settings is
at least 1/n. This implies a bound of n/2 in both the deterministic and stochastic
cases.
To show that these bounds can be reached consider a graph consisting of two
disjoint directed cycles with n − 2 and 2 players, respectively, and only one pivot
player in the longest cycle who has an additional link connecting to the 2-cycle. See
Fig. 5.
Figure 5. A graph with PoS = PoA = n/2.
This pivot player is the only one who can randomize by sending the buck to the
2-cycle with probability p and following the long cycle with probability (1− p). For
a uniform initial measure µ, the unique strategy that minimizes the social cost is
the deterministic one which sets p = 0 inducing a social cost of 1/n (perfectly fair).
This is not an equilibrium though, since the pivot player may deviate to p ∈ (0, 1]
in the SBPG and to p = 1 in the DBPG, and in all these equilibria the buck is
absorbed in the 2-cycle, whose players pay 1/2 each. Hence in both cases we get
PoS(S) = PoS(Σ) = n/2. 
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A natural question is how PoA and PoS change from the deterministic to the sto-
chastic settings. The comparison is not straightforward since the reference baseline
set by the minimal social cost may be different in both cases. Moreover, as seen in
Example 3.1, even if the graph is Hamiltonian with the same baseline
min
pi∈Σ
SC(pi) = min
s∈S
SC(s) = 1/n
we may still have
PoA(Σ) ≥ n
n− 1 > PoA(S) = 1.
Proposition 4.2. For any buck-passing game Γ(G, µ) we have
(a) minpi∈Σ SC(pi) ≤ mins∈S SC(s)
(b) PoA(S) ≤ PoA(Σ)
possibly with strict inequalities.
Proof. Part (a) follows directly by noting that each s ∈ S is equivalent to a deter-
ministic strategy in Σ, and then (b) follows from the inclusion NE(S) ⊆ NE(Σ) in
Proposition 3.3. To see that the inequalities may be strict consider the graph in
Fig. 6 composed of two disjoint cycles with 2 vertices each, plus a transient vertex
connected to both cycles. If we initially assign the buck to this transient vertex with
Figure 6. A graph with min
pi∈Σ
SC(pi) < min
s∈S
SC(s). The initial measure µ
is concentrated on the central vertex.
probability one, then the minimum social cost over Σ attained with p = 12 , whereas
over S the optimum is attained for p = 0 and p = 1. Hence
min
pi∈Σ
SC(pi) =
1
4
< min
s∈S
SC(s) =
1
2
,
PoA(S) = 1 < PoA(Σ) = 2. 
If Proposition 4.2(a) holds with equality, the inclusion NE(S) ⊆ NE(Σ) implies
PoS(Σ) ≤ PoS(S). However, as shown by Example 4.4 in the next section, in general
there is no order between PoS(Σ) and PoS(S). The following special case presents
a situation where the deterministic and stochastic buck-passing game have price of
stability equal to 1.
Proposition 4.3. If G is a disjoint union of strongly connected components, then
for every buck-passing game Γ(G, µ) we have PoS(S) = PoS(Σ) = 1.
Proof. It suffices to show that the optimal social cost over Σ is attained at a deter-
ministic strategy s ∈ S which is also an equilibrium, namely s ∈ NE(S) ⊆ NE(Σ).
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Let B1, . . .BM be the strongly connected components in G and choose a collection
of longest cycles C1, . . . , CM , one in each component. Consider the strategy profile s
induced by these cycles and where all the other players are free riders. By construc-
tion none of these cycles can be destroyed nor extended, so that s is a prior-free NE
for the DBPG, hence also for the SBPG by virtue of Proposition 3.3. It remains to
show that, for every initial measure µ, this deterministic strategy profile s minimizes
the social cost over Σ (hence also over S). Indeed, call µ` the initial mass of the
component B`. Being |C`| the length of the maximal cycle in B`, for every pi ∈ Σ
and each player i ∈ C` we have Epi[Ti | X0 = i] ≤ |C`| so that (3.3) then yields
ci(pi) ≥ µ`|C`| = ci(s). It follows that SC(pi) ≥ SC(s) completing the proof. 
4.2. Some examples. The following examples show that, depending on the struc-
ture of the graph G, the inequalities in Proposition 4.1 can be tight or not. The first
two examples concern respectively the cases of complete graphs and cycles, with a
uniform initial measure µ. These graphs are symmetric in the sense that (i, j) ∈ E
iff (j, i) ∈ E , and they have a Hamiltonian cycle which is both an optimal profile and
a Nash equilibrium so that the optimal social cost is 1/n and PoS(S) = PoS(Σ) = 1.
Figure 7. The complete graph K6 and the bi-directional cycle C10. For
ease of representation in the first picture we used bidirectional arrows in-
stead of drawing two arrows for each couple of vertices. These two graphs
admit a Hamiltonian cycle.
Example 4.1. For the buck-passing game on the complete graph Kn with n vertices,
the Nash equilibria (both in the deterministic and stochastic versions) are exactly
the profiles s ∈ S such that Gs is a Hamiltonian cycle, and therefore
PoS(S) = PoA(S) = 1 = PoS(Σ) = PoA(Σ).
Example 4.2. In the bi-directional cycle Cn on n vertices the game may give rise to
very unfair equilibria. Notice that the strategy of each player reduces to a choice
between her left and right neighbors, and all cycles are either of length 2 or n.
As noted before, a player will never pay more than 1/2. However, the equilibrium
described in Fig. 2 features exactly two players on a cycle of length 2 and each one
pays exactly 1/2, so that in this case
PoS(S) = PoS(Σ) = 1 < PoA(S) = PoA(Σ) = n/2.
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Example 4.3. In the previous examples we had either PoS(S) = PoS(Σ) = 1 or
PoA(S) = PoA(Σ) = n/2. For the graph in Fig. 8, with a uniform initial measure
µ, these values are bounded away from these extremes. Indeed, notice that only
Figure 8. A network with 1 < PoS < PoA < n2 . Here we consider µ as
the uniform measure on the vertex set.
the two players on the central cycle have the possibility to randomize. The optimal
strategy is attained for p = q = 0 with
min
pi∈Σ
SC(pi) = min
s∈S
SC(s) =
1
10
.
However, this is not an equilibrium and NE(Σ) is precisely characterized by p+q > 0.
The best equilibrium is achieved with p = 0, q = 1, and the worse with p = 1, q = 0.
These are in fact determinstic equilibria in NE(S), so that
1 < PoS(S) = PoS(Σ) = 7
5
<
5
3
= PoA(S) = PoA(Σ) < n
2
.
Example 4.4. In general there is no order between PoS(S) and PoS(Σ), and either
one may be larger. Indeed, in Fig. 9 the optimal cost both for S and Σ is 16 , attained
with p = q = 0. The best equilibrium over S is attained for p = 1, q = 0 (as well
as p = 0, q = 1) with social cost 13 , whereas the best equilibrium over Σ is attained
with p = q = 12 for a social cost of
1
4 . Hence
3
2 = PoS(Σ) < PoS(S) = 2. Now, in
Figure 9. A buck-passing game with PoS(Σ) < PoS(S). The initial mea-
sure µ is uniform across all 6 vertices.
Fig. 10 the deterministic social optimum is 13 attained with p = 1, q = 0 and r = 1.
This is also an equilibrium so that PoS(S) = 1. In the stochastic case the minimum
cost is 16 (attained with p = q =
1
2 and r = 0), while the best equilibrium is achieved
for r = 1, p = 34 , q =
1
4 , with social cost
1
4 and then PoS(Σ) =
3
2 > PoS(S).
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Figure 10. A buck-passing game with PoS(Σ) > PoS(S). The initial
measure µ assigns the buck to the leftmost vertex with probability 23 , and
to the rightmost vertex with probability 13 .
5. Markov chains, spanning trees and spectra
In the next section we will study the existence of equilibria for buck-passing games
when the strategy sets of the players are restricted to more general subsets of the
whole simplices of probabilities over out-neighbors. We will achieve this by extending
the generalized potential function in (2.10), which requires some powerful tools in
Markov chains. In particular, we will exploit classical results linking probability and
graph theory, which can be traced back to Kirchhoff (1847).
5.1. The Markov chain tree theorem revisited. We begin by discussing the
Markov chain tree theorem, introduced by Leighton and Rivest (1986) (see also
Aldous and Fill, 2002, Anantharam and Tsoucas, 1989). For the sake of completeness
we present a short proof that unveils its connection with the buck-passing games.
The idea of the proof is to focus on spanning unicycles rather than trees. Consider
a Markov chain on a finite state space V with transition matrix pi = (piij)i,j∈V , and
assume that it has a unique recurrent class C ⊆ V, so that all vertices in V \ C
are transient. In this case there is a unique invariant measure ρ = (ρ(i))i∈V , with
ρ(i) > 0 iff i ∈ C.
We now define the weight function ωpi : 2E → [0, 1] as follows: for every A ⊂ E
ωpi(A) =
∏
(i,j)∈A
piij . (5.1)
Note that each strategy profile s ∈ S in the deterministic buck-passing game can
be identified with the subset of induced edges Es. Thus —with a slight abuse of
notation and only for this section— we identify S with the family of all subsets
s ⊂ E that contain exactly one outgoing edge for each i ∈ V.
We then consider the probability space (S,Qpi, 2S), where
Qpi(s) = ωpi(s) =
∏
(i,j)∈s
piij . (5.2)
It is easy to see that Qpi(S) = 1. From a probabilistic perspective, the multiplicative
form of Qpi implies that a random s ∈ S sampled according to Qpi, can be seen as
the outcome of n independent draws of an outgoing edge (i, j) ∈ N+i for each i ∈ V.
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We call Ti(V) the set of i-rooted spanning trees in the complete graph with vertex
set V and define
Ωi(pi) :=
∑
τ∈Ti(V)
ωpi(τ) and ΩV(pi) :=
∑
j∈V
Ωj(pi). (5.3)
Notice that a vertex i ∈ V is transient iff Ωi(pi) = 0, so that C = {i ∈ V : Ωi(pi) > 0}.
Note also that when computing Ωi(pi) it suffices to consider the spanning trees in the
induced graph Gpi, which contains only the edges with piij > 0, since the remaining
trees have weight zero. However, to avoid keeping track of the dependence on the
topology of Gpi, it is convenient to consider all spanning trees in the complete graph
with vertex set V.
Theorem 5.1 (Markov chain tree theorem). Consider a Markov chain with transi-
tion matrix pi and with a single recurrent class. Then, the unique invariant measure
ρ is given by
ρ(i) =
Ωi(pi)
ΩV(pi)
. (5.4)
As mentioned before, each s ∈ S can be identified with a pure strategy profile
in the deterministic buck-passing game, so the induced graph Gs is a disjoint union
of unicycles. Let U denote the set of all s ∈ S inducing a single spanning unicycle.
Moreover, let Ui be the spanning unicycles that have i in the cycle, and Uij those in
which the edge (i, j) is part of the cycle.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Call xi := Ωi(pi) and x := ΩV(pi). We observe that each
s ∈ Uij is of the form s = τ ∪ {(i, j)} for a unique i-rooted tree τ ∈ Ti(V) so that
ωpi(s) = ωpi(τ)piij , and therefore Qpi(Uij) = xi piij . Now, the set Ui can be expressed
as a disjoint union Ui = ∪˙j∈V Uij , so that
Qpi(Ui) =
∑
j∈V
Qpi(Uij) =
∑
j∈V
xi piij = xi. (5.5)
Similarly, if we focus on the edge (k, i) preceeding i, we may write Ui = ∪˙k∈V Uki,
so that
xi = Qpi(Ui) =
∑
k∈V
Qpi(Uki) =
∑
k∈V
xj piki. (5.6)
This shows that (xi)i∈V is a left eigenvector of pi with eigenvalue 1, so it is collinear
with the invariant measure ρ. The conclusion follows dividing each xi by x. 
As a by-product of the previous proof, we observe that Ωi(pi) can be expressed
as the expected length of spanning unicycles. Indeed, consider the random variable
1{s∈Ui} whose expected value is the probability that vertex i lies on the cycle of a
spanning unicycle, that is,
EQpi [1Ui ] = Qpi(Ui) = Ωi(pi). (5.7)
Moreover, let
Λ(s) :=
∑
i∈V
1{s∈Ui} (5.8)
be the length of the cycle if s ∈ S is a spanning unicycle, and 0 otherwise.
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Corollary 5.2. Consider a Markov chain with transition matrix pi and with a single
recurrent class C ⊆ V. Then ΩV(pi) = EQpi [Λ] and, in particular, ΩV(pi) ≤ |C|.
Remark 5.3. Note that Λ(s) is the total length of the cycle in the graph Gs, which
appears in the potential (2.10) for the deterministic buck-passing game. In the next
section, see Eq. (6.6), we introduce a potential for the stochastic buck-passing game
which involves the expected value EQpi [Λ].
5.2. A spectral perspective. We next provide a representation of Ω(pi) in terms
of the spectrum of the Laplacian matrix Lpi := I − pi. This is essentially a conse-
quence of the celebrated matrix-tree theorem, which generalizes the original work of
Kirchhoff (1847) (see, e.g., Brooks et al., 1940, Chaiken and Kleitman, 1978).
For a matrix L, let L(i|j) denote the matrix obtained from L by removing row i
and column j, and consider the adjugate matrix, whose entries are given by
adj(L)ij = (−1)i+j detL(i|j). (5.9)
Theorem 5.4 (matrix-tree theorem). For a Markov chain with a unique recurrent
class and Laplacian L we have∑
τ∈T (i)
ωpi(τ) = detL(i|i). (5.10)
Hence,
ΩV(pi) = tr[adj(Lpi)]. (5.11)
From this result we obtain the following alternative formula for ΩV(pi) in terms
of the nonzero eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix.
Theorem 5.5. Let pi be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with a unique recur-
rent class. Call {λ(1)pi , . . . , λ(n)pi } a specific ordering of the spectrum of the Laplacian
matrix Lpi, such that λ
(1)
pi = 0, whereas all the other (possibly complex) eigenvalues
have a non-zero modulus. Then
ΩV(pi) =
n∏
i=2
λ
(i)
pi . (5.12)
Proof. Consider the spectral decomposition of Lpi = UJU−1 with J the Jordan
matrix having the eigenvalues λ(i)pi on the diagonal in increasing order of i, and U
an orthogonal matrix. We have
tr adj(Lpi) = tr(adj(U) adj(J) adj(U
−1)) (5.13)
= tr(det(U)U−1 adj(J) det(U−1)U) (5.14)
= tr(U−1 adj(J)U) (5.15)
= tr adj(J) (5.16)
=
n∏
i=2
λ
(i)
pi , (5.17)
where the first equality is due to the fact that adjugate and product commute;
the second equality stems from the fact that the adjugate of a full rank matrix is
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the inverse of that matrix times its determinant; the third equality derives from
det(M−1) = [det(M)]−1, when M is full rank; the fourth is just the invariance
of trace with respect to change of basis; for the last one consider that Lpi is the
Laplacian of an irreducible chain, so the only nonzero element on the diagonal of
adj(J) is the cofactor (1|1). Indeed, the Laplacian of an irreducible chain has a
kernel of dimension 1. Hence, the Jordan Matrix J has the first row and the first
column equal to zero. This immediately implies that all the cofactors (i|i) of J are
zero except for i = 1. 
6. The constrained buck-passing game
We consider next a generalized version of the stochastic buck-passing game, in
which player i’s strategy set is a subset Ξi ⊂ Σi. Accordingly, we define Ξ := ×i∈VΞi.
We call this game Γ(G, µ,Ξ) a constrained buck-passing game (CBPG), and we
denote NE(Ξ) its set of Nash equilibria. We will show that CBPGs are generalized
ordinal potential games.
For the sake of simplicity, consider first a strategy profile pi inducing an irreducible
Markov chain. In this case, by Theorem 5.1, the cost for player i is simply
ci(pi) = ρpi(i) =
Ωi(pi)
ΩV(pi)
. (6.1)
Since the numerator Ωi(pi) in (6.1) does not depend on pii, a profitable deviation
for player i ∈ V can only be achieved by increasing the denominator ΩV(pi). This
suggests to take the map Ψ(pi) = −ΩV(pi) as a generalized ordinal potential. Since
Ψ does not depend on µ, any of its minimizers provides a PFNE. This is indeed the
case if every strategy profile pi ∈ Ξ gives rise to an irreducible Markov chain.
6.1. A generalized ordinal potential. To get a workable expression for the costs
(3.6), we use the Markov chain tree formula. To this end, consider the transient
closures of the recurrent classes
A`pi :=
{
j ∈ V : Pj→`pi = 1
}
∀ ` = 1, . . . ,M(pi) (6.2)
and the residual transient class that contains the remaining vertices
Rpi :=
{
j ∈ V : Pj→`pi < 1, ∀` = 1, . . . ,M(pi)
}
, (6.3)
where Pj→`pi is defined as in (3.4).
Each set A`pi is closed with respect to the Markov chain and C`pi ⊆ A`pi. Therefore,
the restriction of the original Markov chain to A`pi is itself a Markov chain having
C`pi as its unique recurrent class, so that Theorem 5.1 gives
ρ`pi(i) =

Ω`i(pi)
Ω`(pi)
if i ∈ A`pi
0 if i ∈ V \ A`pi
(6.4)
where
Ω`i(pi) =
∑
τ∈Ti(A`pi)
ωpi(τ) and Ω`(pi) =
∑
i∈A`pi
Ω`i(pi), (6.5)
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with Ti(A`pi) the set of i-rooted spanning trees in the complete graph over A`pi.
With these preliminaries, we may now state our main result for CBPGs.
Theorem 6.1. The constrained buck-passing game Γ(G, µ,Ξ) admits the generalized
ordinal potential
Ψ(pi) :=
M(pi)∑
`=1
(n− Ω`(pi)), (6.6)
with Ω`(pi) defined by (6.5).
Proof. Consider a profitable deviation by a player i from pi to pi′ := (pi′i,pi−i), with
ci(pi
′) < ci(pi). This conveys the fact that ci(pi) > 0, so that from Eq. (3.6) it follows
that player i must belong to a recurrent class C`pi with µ`pi > 0. We distinguish two
possible scenarios, depending on whether the player remains recurrent or becomes
transient after deviating.
Case 1: pi′ij = 0 for all j 6∈ A`pi. In this case i remains recurrent and, although C`pi
may change, we have A`pi′ = A`pi and µ`pi′ = µ`pi > 0. It then follows from (3.6) that
ci(pi
′) < ci(pi) is equivalent to ρ`pi′(i) < ρ
`
pi(i). Now, since the weight of any i-rooted
tree τ ∈ Ti(A`pi) = Ti(A`pi′) does not depend on pii nor pi′i, we get Ω`i(pi) = Ω`i(pi′).
Then, from (6.4) it follows that ρ`pi′(i) < ρ
`
pi(i) is equivalent to Ω`(pi′) > Ω`(pi),
which implies Ψ(pi′) < Ψ(pi).
Case 2: pi′ij > 0 for some j 6∈ A`pi. In this case i together with all vertices in
A`pi become transient and their costs drop to zero. We distinguish two subcases
depending whether i becomes residual transient or it is absorbed into a different
class.
Case 2.1: i ∈ Rpi′ . In this case the class A`pi becomes part of Rpi′ , while the
remaining classes Ahpi remain unchanged. Hence, we lose the `-th term in the sum
of (6.6), while the other terms do not change. From Corollary 5.2 we have Ω`(pi) ≤
|C`pi| < n, so that the removed term is strictly positive and Ψ(pi′) < Ψ(pi).
Case 2.2: Pi→hpi′ = 1 for some h 6= `. Here the full class A`pi is absorbed into the
h-th class, that is, Ahpi′ = Ahpi∪A`pi, so that the `-th and h-th terms in the sum Ψ(pi)
are merged into the single h-th term in Ψ(pi′), while the other terms do not change.
Hence, Ψ(pi′) < Ψ(pi) is equivalent to
n− Ωh(pi′) < [n− Ω`(pi)] + [n− Ωh(pi)],
which follows by noting that Ωh(pi′) > 0 and using Corollary 5.2 once again, which
gives
Ω`(pi) + Ωh(pi) ≤ |C`pi|+ |Chpi| ≤ n.
In all scenarios we have that ci(pi′) < ci(pi) implies Ψ(pi′) < Ψ(pi), which proves
that Ψ is a generalized ordinal potential. 
We stress the analogy between the potential function Ψ in (6.6) and the one for
the deterministic game in (2.10). Indeed, the quantity |C`s| in the latter is simply the
number of rooted spanning trees for the `-th unicycle and, since in the deterministic
case the weight of each tree is 1, we have |C`s| = Ω`(s). However, in contrast with
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the deterministic case, Ψ may fail to provide an ordinal potential even when µ is
fully supported.
Figure 11. The strategy profile considered in Example 6.1.
Example 6.1. Consider the graph in Fig. 11. The set of players in the corresponding
SBPG is V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the initial distribution µ is assumed to be uniform.
Fix p, q ∈ (0, 1) and consider the following strategy profile
pi12 = pi21 = 1,
pi31 = p, pi34 = 1− p,
pi42 = q, pi43 = 1− q,
pi52 = 1.
This strategy profile induces a unique recurrent class Cpi = {1, 2} and we have
Ω1(pi) = Ω2(pi) = p+ q − pq,
so that
Ψ(pi) = 5− 2(p+ q − pq).
Note that players 3 and 4 can decrease the potential by increasing p and q, respec-
tively, although their cost remains 0, since they are transient. Therefore, Ψ is not
an ordinal potential, even though µ is fully supported. Note also that Ψ(pi)→ 5, as
p and q tend to 0, whereas, for p = q = 0, there are two recurrent classes C1pi = {1, 2}
and C2pi = {3, 4} and the value of the potential is 6. Therefore Ψ is not continuous,
and not even lower semicontinuous.
Remark 6.2. Theorem 6.1 can be connected to some literature that looks at the
Hamiltonian cycle problem from the perspective of Markov chains. Namely, consid-
ering the set of transition matrices that are compatible with a given graph G, this
literature focuses on the class of functionals whose global minimum is attained on
a permutation matrix which corresponds to a Hamiltonian cycle, provided it exists
(see, e.g., Borkar et al., 2012, Ejov et al., 2011, Filar, 2006, Filar and Krass, 1994).
Theorem 6.1 shows that the potential function Ψ in (6.6) belongs to this class.
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6.2. Existence of equilibria. We now address the existence of a PFNE for general
constrained buck-passing games. The fact that Γ(G, µ,Ξ) has a generalized ordinal
potential guarantees the existence of ε-equilibria.
Proposition 6.3. For each ε > 0 the constrained buck-passing game Γ(G, µ,Ξ) has
an ε-NE which is also prior-free.
Proof. The existence of an ε-NE is a consequence of Monderer and Shapley (1996,
Lemmata 4.1 and 4.2). See also Lã et al. (2016, Section 2.2.2.2). Prior-freeness is
due to the fact that the potential function Ψ in (6.6) does not depend on µ. 
Since Ψ is not lower semicontinuous, even if Ξ is compact, we cannot invoke
Proposition 2.5 to establish existence of equilibria, so we develop an ad hoc argument
that requires some additional notation and preliminary results.
Let Ξ0 denote the set of strategy profiles pi ∈ Ξ with a minimal number of
recurrent classes M0 = minpi∈ΞM(pi), and let Ξ(pi) be the set of all unilateral
deviations pi′ = (pi′i,pi−i) by recurrent players i ∈ C1pi ∪˙ · · · ∪˙ CM
0
pi . Our first result is
the following simple observation.
Lemma 6.4. For each pi ∈ Ξ0 and pi′ ∈ Ξ(pi) we have M(pi′) = M0 and A`pi′ = A`pi
for all ` = 1, . . . ,M0. Moreover, if Ξ is compact then infpi′∈Ξ(pi) Ψ(pi′) is attained.
Proof. By the minimality of M(pi) = M0, a recurrent player i ∈ C`pi cannot become
transient after a unilateral deviation pi′ = (pi′i,pi−i), so that pi
′
ij = 0 for all j 6∈ A`pi.
Hence, every such deviation preserves the number of classes M(pi′) = M(pi) = M0,
as well as all the transient closures A`pi′ = A`pi. It follows that, for all pi′ ∈ Ξ(pi),
Ψ(pi′) =
M(pi)∑
`=1
(n− Ω`(pi′)) with Ω`(pi′) =
∑
i∈A`pi
∑
τ∈Ti(A`pi)
ωpi′(τ). (6.7)
For fixed pi these functions are continuous with respect to pi′ and the set Ξ(pi) is
compact, since it is a section of a compact set. Therefore, the minimum of Ψ(pi′)
over Ξ(pi) is attained. 
Our next step is less trivial and requires the notion of skeleton of a transient
closure A`pi, defined as any rooted tree
τ̂ `pi ∈
⋃
i∈A`pi
Ti(A`pi) (6.8)
having maximal weight ωpi(τ). Note that
Ω`(pi) ≤ Rn ωpi(τ̂ `pi ), (6.9)
where Rn is the number of rooted trees on n vertices.
Theorem 6.5. Suppose that Ξ is compact. Then there exists pi ∈ Ξ0 such that
Ψ(pi) ≤ Ψ(pi′) for all pi′ ∈ Ξ(pi).
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Proof. Fix pi0 ∈ Ξ0 and, for ` = 1, . . . ,M0, let A` = A`pi0 be the corresponding
transient closures. Consider a sequence defined inductively by
pik+1 ∈ arg min
pi′∈Ξ(pik)
Ψ(pi′), (6.10)
so that M(pik) = M0 and A`
pik
≡ A` for ` = 1, . . . ,M0 and all k ∈ N.
Since pik ∈ Ξ(pik) we have Ψ(pik+1) ≤ Ψ(pik). If equality holds for some k, then
the conclusion follows by taking pi = pik. Consider then the case where Ψ(pik+1) <
Ψ(pik) for all k ∈ N. Note that along the iterations we have
Ψ(pik) =
M0∑
`=1
(n− Ω`(pik)) with Ω`(pik) =
∑
i∈A`
∑
τ∈Ti(A`)
ωpik(τ), (6.11)
so that
∑M0
`=1 Ω
`(pik) increases with k. Moreover, pik+1 is obtained from pik by a
deviation of a player ik in some recurrent class C`kpik , so that only the `k-th term in
the sum changes and therefore Ω`(pik) is nondecreasing in k for each ` = 1, . . . ,M0.
In particular Ω`(pik) remains bounded away from 0, and then, using (6.9), we may
find ε > 0 such that,
for all k ∈ N, ωpik(τ̂ `pik) ≥ ε. (6.12)
Take a convergent subsequence pikm → pi ∈ Ξ, and extract a further subsequence
along which the skeletons are constant τ̂ `
pikm
≡ τ̂ ` for ` = 1, . . . ,M0. Passing to
the limit in (6.12) along this subsequence we get ωpi(τ̂ `) ≥ ε, which implies that
A` is still connected in the limit and therefore M(pi) = M0 and A`pi = A`. From
these facts, using (6.11) and the continuity of the polynomials pi 7→ ωpi(τ), we
obtain Ψ(pikm) → Ψ(pi). Since Ψ(pik) is decreasing, we conclude in fact that the
full sequence of potential values converges Ψ(pik)→ Ψ(pi).
We now show that the limit point pi satisfies the claim of the theorem. Indeed,
we already proved that M(pi) = M0, so that pi ∈ Ξ0. Now, consider a player i ∈ C`pi
and a deviation pi′ = (pi′i,pi−i). Since i ∈ C`pi, it follows that, for each j ∈ A`, there
is a path from j to i whose edges have positive probability under pi. Since pikm → pi
this is also the case for pikm for m large enough. Hence, i ∈ C`
pikm
and then the
definition of the sequence pik implies that
Ψ(pikm+1) ≤ Ψ(pi′i,pikm−i ). (6.13)
From Lemma 6.4 we have that (pi′i,pi
km
−i ) has the same transient closures A` as pikm ,
so we may write explicitly
Ψ(pikm+1) ≤ Ψ(pi′i,pikm−i ) =
M0∑
`=1
n−∑
i∈A`
∑
τ∈Ti(A`)
ω
(pi′i,pi
km
−i )
(τ)
.
Letting m→∞, we conclude
Ψ(pi) ≤
M0∑
`=1
n−∑
i∈A`
∑
τ∈Ti(A`)
ω(pi′i,pi−i)(τ)
 = Ψ(pi′i,pi−i), (6.14)
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where in the last equality we used once again Lemma 6.4, according to which
M(pi′i,pi−i) = M
0 and A`(pi′i,pi−i) = A
`. This shows that Ψ(pi) ≤ Ψ(pi′) for all
pi′ ∈ Ξ(pi), completing the proof. 
With these preliminaries, we may now prove the existence of prior-free equilibria.
Theorem 6.6. Every constrained buck-passing game Γ(G, µ,Ξ) in which Ξ is com-
pact admits a PFNE.
Proof. Consider pi ∈ Ξ0 as in Theorem 6.5. We will show that this pi is a NE for
every initial µ. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a player i and a deviation
pi′ = (pi′i,pi−i) such that ci(pi
′) < ci(pi). As noted in the proof of Theorem 6.1,
player i must belong to some recurrent class C`pi with µ`pi > 0. Moreover, pi ∈ Ξ0
so that Lemma 6.4 implies that A`pi′ = A`pi and, a fortiori, µ`pi′ = µ`pi. Arguing
as in Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 6.1, the cost reduction must come from a
decrease in the stationary probability ρ`pi′(i) < ρ
`
pi(i). This is in turn equivalent to
Ω`(pi′) > Ω`(pi) and implies Ψ(pi′) < Ψ(pi), which contradicts the choice of pi. 
7. Variations on the theme
7.1. The buck-holding game. In this section we consider a different game, called
buck-holding game (BHG) which we denote Γˆ(G, µ). This game is similar to the
buck-passing game described in the previous sections, but now the goal of each
player is to maximize the fraction of time in which she has the buck. Hence, the
cost in (2.3) becomes a payoff. The definitions of improvement and Nash equilibrium
change accordingly.
Definition 7.1. Consider a game with payoffs (ci)i∈V .
(a) Given a strategy profile s ∈ S, a unilateral deviation for player i is a strategy
s′ ∈ S which differs from s only in its i-th coordinate. It is a profitable
deviation if in addition ci(s′) > ci(s), in which case the difference ci(s′) −
ci(s) is called the improvement of player i.
(b) A strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player has a
profitable deviation. Similarly, it is an ε-Nash equilibrium (ε-NE) if no
player has a profitable deviation with an improvement larger than ε.
Definition 2.4 still holds, but now the goal is to maximize the potential.
In a deterministic buck-holding game (DBHG) Γˆ(G, µ,S) each player chooses a
single out-neighbor. The following definition is needed to analyze these games.
Definition 7.2. A strategy profile is called a weakly prior-free Nash equilibrium
(WPFNE) if it is an equilibrium for every fully supported initial distribution µ.
Proposition 7.3. Let µ be a fully supported initial measure on V. Then
(a) A deterministic buck-holding game Γˆ(G, µ,S) is an ordinal potential game,
with the ordinal potential Ψ as in (2.10).
(b) Every deterministic buck-holding game Γˆ(G, µ,S) admits a WPFNE.
(c) In a deterministic buck-holding game every improvement path has length
O(n2). There exist instances with improvement paths of length Θ(n2).
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Proof. Given a profile s ∈ S, consider a player i ∈ V who has a profitable deviation
s′i and let s
′ := (s′i, s−i). Since ci(s
′) > ci(s), one of the following two scenarios
occurs:
(C1) Player i ∈ C`s for some ` ≤ M(s) and s′i ∈ A`s in such a way that the cycle
where i lies becomes shorter. Notice that in this case A`s = A`s′ , hence
µ`s = µ
`
s′ and the new payoff of player i is given by
ci(s
′) =
|C`s|
|C`s′ |
ci(s). (7.1)
Notice that s′i can be a vertex in C`s as well as a vertex in A`s \ C`s.
(C2) Player i is transient in s and becomes recurrent in s′, creating a new class.
In particular, assume i ∈ Ahs for some h ≤M(s). We will have
C`s = C`s′ , for all ` ≤M(s) (7.2)
and s′ has a new cycle CM(s′)s′ 3 i, with M(s′) = M(s) + 1. Moreover, we
have
A`s = A`s′ , for all ` ≤M(s), ` 6= h, (7.3)
and
AM(s′)s′ ∪ Ahs′ = Ahs. (7.4)
Notice that in this case the deviation is profitable for i because, by the
assumption that µ is fully supported, we have µM(s
′)
s′ > 0. It is worth noting
that full support of initial distribution µ is needed for the arguments that
follows. Our assumption on µ is enough to guarantee that every deviation
of type (C2) is improving for the deviating player, which is what we need to
show that Ψ is a ordinal potential function.
The claims of the theorem now follow straightforwardly.
(a) We argue as in Theorem 2.8. Let Ψ be defined as in (2.10). If ci(s′) > ci(s),
then Ψ(s′) > Ψ(s), both under (C1) and (C2). Indeed, if a deviation of type (C1)
takes place, then
Ψ(s′)−Ψ(s) = |C`s| − |C`s′ | > 0. (7.5)
On the other hand, if a deviation of type (C2) takes place, then
Ψ(s′)−Ψ(s) = n− |Chs′ |+ n− |CM(s
′)
s′ | − (n− |Chs |) > 0. (7.6)
This proves that the game is generalized ordinal potential. To prove that it is,
indeed, ordinal potential, we have to check that Ψ(s′) > Ψ(s) implies a deviation
of type (C1) or (C2). This, again, follows the line of Theorem 2.8. Indeed, if
s′ = (s′i, s−i) and Ψ(s
′) > Ψ(s), then, either s′ has one extra cycle, which implies
that the deviation s to s′ is of type (C2) and is improving for the deviating player,
or the cycle in which i lies in s has been shortened in s′, which implies that the
deviation is of type (C1), therefore ci(s′) > ci(s).
(b) To prove the existence of WPFNE, notice that the strategies in which Ψ is
maximized are NE for every initial distribution µ which is fully supported. It is
worth noting that, since we can claim the potential nature of the game only if µ is
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fully supported, weak prior-freeness is the best we can achieve with the techniques
developed in the previous sections.
(c) To show that the uniform upper bound of Theorem 2.10 applies also to DBHGs,
consider the following: Deviations of type (C2) can occur at most bn/2c − 1 times,
since the number of cycles is between 1 and bn/2c. On the other hand, each cycle
can be shrunk at most n − 2 times. Hence, we have a quadratic upper bound. On
the other hand, a lower bound of the same order of magnitude can be obtained using
a complete graph with an even number of vertices, as in the proof of Theorem 2.10.
The starting configuration is now a Hamiltonian cycle and the improvement steps
are the same of the DBPG, but in reverse order. 
Remark 7.4. We say that G admits a perfect matching if there exists a partition
V1 ∪˙ V2 = V and a subset E˜ ⊂ E of cardinality n such that, for each i ∈ V1 and
j ∈ V2, both (i, j) ∈ E˜ and (j, i) ∈ E˜ . In a DBPG, if G admits a Hamiltonian cycle,
then the strategy profile s in which players play along such cycle is a NE. In a
DBHG, if G admits a perfect matching, then the strategy profile that realizes this
matching is a NE. Indeed, in this case, for any possible deviation, the payoff of the
deviating player would drop to zero. More generally, we saw in Section 2 that for a
connected graph G, every unicyclic strategy in which the cycle cannot be extended
by a unilateral deviation is a PFNE. Similarly, in a DBHG, a subgraph s ∈ S in
which every player is in a cycle that she cannot unilaterally shorten is a PFNE.
We now show the holding analogue of Theorem 6.1. Given a directed graph
G(V, E), an initial distribution µ, and an arbitrary set of strategy profiles Ξ as in
Section 6, we consider the constrained buck-holding game Γˆ(G, µ,Ξ).
Proposition 7.5. Every constrained buck-holding game Γˆ(G, µ,Ξ) in which µ is
fully supported is generalized ordinal potential with generalized ordinal potential func-
tion Ψ as in (2.10).
Proof. Consider a profitable deviation for player i from pi to pi′ := (pi′i,pi−i), with
ci(pi
′) > ci(pi). As for the deterministic case, we distinguish two possible scenarios,
depending on whether the player i is recurrent or transient before the deviation.
Notice that player i cannot improve her payoff by moving some probability mass
out of her own transient closure class.
Case 1: i is recurrent both in pi and pi′. This is the stochastic version of (C1).
Although C`pi may change, we have A`pi′ = A`pi and µ`pi′ = µ`pi > 0. It then follows
from (3.6) that ci(pi′) > ci(pi) is equivalent to ρ`pi′(i) > ρ
`
pi(i). Now, since the weight
of any i-rooted tree τ ∈ Ti(A`pi) = Ti(A`pi′) does not depend on pii nor pi′i, we get
Ω`i(pi) = Ω
`
i(pi
′). Then, from (6.4) it follows that ρ`pi′(i) > ρ
`
pi(i) is equivalent to
Ω`(pi′) < Ω`(pi), which implies Ψ(pi′) > Ψ(pi).
Case 2: i transient in pi but recurrent in pi′. This is the stochastic version of
(C2). In this case i creates a new recurrent class. Hence, using the notation of
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Proposition 7.3, we have
Ψ(pi′)−Ψ(pi) = n− Ωh(pi′) + n− ΩM(pi′)(pi′)− (n− Ωh(pi))
= n+ Ωh(pi)− ΩM(pi′)(pi′)− Ωh(pi′)
≥ n+ Ωh(pi)− |AM(pi′)pi′ | − |Ahpi′ |
= n+ Ωh(pi)− |Ahpi| > 0,
where the inequality stems from Ωh(pi) > 0 and |Ahpi| ≤ n. 
Corollary 7.6. For every ε > 0, a constrained buck-holding game Γˆ(G, µ,Ξ) has
the ε-FIP and admits a weakly prior-free ε-NE.
Unfortunately, mimicking the argument of Theorems 6.5 and 6.6 and Lemma 6.4
is not enough to prove the existence of PFNE for general compact strategy space Ξ.
Indeed, the notion of skeleton introduced in Section 6.2 does not guarantee that the
transient closures are retained in the limit. Nonetheless, the following proposition
easily follows by the previous analysis.
Proposition 7.7. Every constrained buck-holding game Γˆ(G, µ,Ξ) in which one of
the following holds admits a WPFNE:
(i) The set Ξ is finite and µ is fully supported.
(ii) For every pi ∈ Ξ the associated Markov chain is irreducible.
7.2. The PageRank game. The PageRank dynamics was introduced by Brin and
Page (1998) as a tool to rank webpages. From a mathematical perspective, PageR-
ank is a Markov chain on the state space V of web-pages, where two webpages
i, j ∈ V are connected by a directed edge (i, j) ∈ E if there exists a weblink on
page i leading to page j. A websurfer visiting a given page i at time t clicks at
random on a link (i, j) ∈ E and moves to page j at time t + 1. Alternatively, with
small probability, she chooses one of the billion webpages in V according to ν. This
describes a Markov chain having a unique stationary measure ρ, according to which
webpages are then ranked.
We now consider a game-theoretic version of this problem, where players are
webmasters whose strategies are the out-links of their webpages and the payoff is
the ranking of their pages. This model lies in the realm of BHGs. In particular, the
game can be framed as follows: we identify the web pages with the set V = {1, . . . , n}
and we consider G = Kn, the complete graph. We fix a dumping factor α ∈ (0, 1)
and a fully supported probability measure ν on V, which can be seen as a column
vector of size n. For each player i, the strategy set Bi ⊂ 2V\{i}, i.e., a strategy bi
of player i is a subset of V \ {i} that satisfies some constraints. For instance, a
page cannot connect to more than a fixed number of other pages; alternatively, if
the page is about some topic it must link to at least another page with a related
content, etc.
Given a strategy profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ B, define the transition matrix Q with
entries
Qij :=
1j∈bi
|bi| . (7.7)
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According to the transition matrix Q player i chooses uniformly at random one of
the players in bi. We then consider the perturbation given by
pi := (1− α)Q+ α1ν>, (7.8)
where 1 is a column vector whose components are all 1, and ν> is a row vector. The
transition matrix pi is irreducible; its unique stationary measure is called PageRank.
The above game can be framed as a constrained buck-holding game as follows:
The set Bi corresponds to the strategy set Ξi of vectors pii such that
piij = (1− α)1j∈bi|bi| + ανj . (7.9)
Since every pi ∈ Ξ is irreducible, the payoff vector does not depend on the initial
measure µ. Therefore, Proposition 7.7(ii) applies and all the equilibria of this game
are prior-free.
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8. List of symbols
A`s unicycle induced by s, defined in Definition 2.1 and Eq. (6.2)
adj adjugate matrix, defined in (5.9)
bi strategy of player i in the PageRank game
b strategy profile in the PageRank game
Bi strategy set of player i in the PageRank game
B set of strategy profiles in the PageRank game
ci cost function of player i, defined in Eqs. (2.3) and (3.6)
Cn bi-directional cycle
C`s cycle induced by s, defined in Definition 2.1
E set of edges
Es subset of edges induced by s, defined in Definition 2.1
Epi set of weighted edges with weights determined by pi
G directed graph
Gs subgraph induced by s, defined in Definition 2.1
Gpi weighted graph induced by pi
Kn complete graph
`(i) label of the unicycle that contains player i
Lpi Laplacian
m˜ := n/2− 1
M(s) number of unicycles under s, defined in Definition 2.1
n number of players
N+i out-neighbors of player i
NE(S) Nash equilibria in DBPG
NE(Σ) Nash equilibria in SBPG
NE(Ξ) Nash equilibria in CBPG
Ppi probability measure induced by pi, defined in (3.1)
P`pi probability of absorption in C`pi
Pj→`pi probability of absorption in C`pi starting from j, defined in (3.4)
PoA price of anarchy, defined in Eqs. (4.2) and (4.4)
PoS price of stability, defined in Eqs. (4.3) and (4.5)
Qpi restriction of ωpi to S, defined in (5.2)
Q transition matrix in the PageRank game, defined in (7.7)
Rn number of rooted trees on n vertices
Rpi residual transient class, defined in (6.3)
si strategy of player i in DBPG
s strategy profile in DBPG
Si strategy set of player i in DBPG
S set of strategy profiles in DBPG
SC social cost function, defined in (4.1)
t time
Ti hitting time of i
T (i) set of i-rooted spanning trees
U set of all s ∈ S inducing a single spanning unicycle
Ui spanning unicycles that have i in the cycle
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Uij spanning unicycles in which the edge (i, j) is part of the cycle
V set of vertices
V0pi set of transient vertices
Wn wheel graph
xi = Qpi(Ui), defined in (5.6)
Xt Markov chain
α dumping factor in the PageRank game
Γ game
δi(s) indicator of i ∈ C`(i)s , defined in (2.5)
Θi,t(s) indicator of the event that player i has the buck at time t under profile s,
defined in (2.1)
λ
(k)
pi eigenvalue of the Laplacian
Λ(s) length of the cycle if s ∈ S is a spanning unicycle, and 0 otherwise, defined
in (5.8)
µ initial measure
µ`s probability that the buck is assigned initially to a vertex in A`s, defined in
(2.4)
µ`s probability that the buck is absorbed in C`s, defined in (3.5)
ν fully supported probability measure in the PageRank game
Ξi strategy set of player i in CBPG
Ξ set of strategy profiles in CBPG
pii strategy of player i in SBPG
pi strategy profile in SBPG
pi transition matrix
ρpi stationary measure induced by pi
ρ`pi stationary measure induced by pi on the class C`pi
ρ`pi stationary measure on C`pi
Σ set of strategy profiles in SBPG
Σi strategy set of player i in SBPG
τ tree
τ̂ `pi skeleton of A`pi, defined in (6.8)
Ψ potential function, defined in Definition 2.4 and Eq. (2.10)
ωpi weight function, defined in (5.1)
Ωi(pi) tree-volume of vertex i, defined in (5.3)
ΩV(pi) tree-volume of the Markov chain, defined in (5.3)
|A| cardinality of set A
1A indicator of set A
